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The Political Economy of Violence 
in Egypt
Magdy Rezk
Abstract This article examines the political economy drivers of the uprisings 
in Egypt in 2011 and 2013. It shows that there was a continuity in neoliberal 
economic policy from the rule of Hosni Mubarak through to that of 
Mohamed Morsi, accompanied by an increase in poverty and unemployment. 
However, it was Egyptian citizens’ perception of the political dynamics 
behind the economic situation that drove them to revolt. In 2011, a sense of 
intolerable levels of corruption and the prospect of their continuation under 
Mubarak’s son, Gamal, made people responsive to calls for revolution; in 2013, 
it was the scale of their disappointment at the unmet promises for economic 
betterment. In both cases, economic conditions were crucial, but political 
grievances and mobilisation ultimately determined and shaped the revolts.
1 Introduction
There has been a great deal of  speculation about whether Egypt’s 
enduring economic crisis, five years after the January 25 revolution 
of  2011, poses a threat to its stability.1 The broader issue at stake here 
concerns the relationship between economic conditions and violence 
(Richani 1997). Despite decades of  interest in the topic, research has 
reached no conclusive findings about whether economic interests or 
problems, such as unemployment, poverty, or social inequalities, affect 
the potential for violence.
The main argument in this article is that economic factors, especially 
the inequitable income distribution, poverty, and unemployment, are 
significant determinants of  political violence, but each one on its own 
is insufficient to provoke violence. Rather, these factors come into play 
in particular political, historic and cultural circumstances contingent 
on the nature of  the system of  governance, the political culture or level 
of  democratic development, and the extent of  corruption, bribery, and 
favouritism in a society. 
It posits that economic circumstances are the objective condition, 
which, absent other subjective conditions, may not act as an impetus 
to violence as a means for political change. In other words, economic 
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factors are a necessary condition for violence, but alone are insufficient 
to cause it. Such a political economy approach avoids the pitfalls of  
simplistic political theory (Krueger and Maleckova 2002) and the 
narrow approach of  economic accounts of  violence, both of  which are 
reductionist and disregard history.2 
The article illustrates this approach with particular reference to the 
2011 and 2013 mass uprisings. Egypt after the January 25 revolution 
is a particularly important case study because it offers a complex 
picture of  various forms of  violence. At the outset of  2011 revolution, 
revolutionaries deployed violence to counter the violence of  the Mubarak 
regime’s security forces, and this was followed by bursts of  revolutionary 
violence under the Supreme Council of  the Armed Forces (SCAF) until 
June 2012 and for a year under Morsi. Terrorist groups, which declared 
their existence immediately after January 25, have also used violence, 
especially in Sinai, and stepped up its use against security forces after 
30 June 2012. Since the January 25 revolution Copts, especially in 
Upper Egypt, and other minority religious communities such as the Shia 
have been victims of  hate crimes. Deteriorating economic conditions, 
which signal the expansion of  the informal economy, seen especially in 
the spread of  sidewalk peddlers and other itinerant vendors, have also 
generated violence. Finally, violent crime has spiked, fuelled in part by a 
security vacuum that has considerably weakened legal deterrents. For all 
this, the analysis below focuses solely on the two major and comparable 
moments of  violence, in 2011 and 2013.
2 The road to January 25, 2011
Two related economic factors underpinned Egypt’s 2011 revolution: 
entrenched poverty, which significantly worsened in the three years 
immediately prior to the revolution, and the nature and power of  
the country’s business elite. These economic contexts are crucial to 
understanding the revolution because they were its necessary conditions, 
but insufficient on their own. 
2.1 Poverty
Socioeconomic conditions in Egypt worsened over the three decades 
of  Mubarak’s rule, and were especially difficult for its poorest citizens. 
The first decade of  Mubarak’s rule (1981–91) saw skyrocketing foreign 
debt and budget deficits, from which the 1991 Gulf  War offered only a 
temporary reprieve, when Western and Arab donors and the Paris Club 
wrote off a significant chunk of  Egypt’s debt burden. This was followed 
by an IMF-led stabilisation programme, which brought the country’s 
budget deficit to 3 per cent of  GDP, brought inflation under control, 
and stabilised the price of  the Egyptian pound (El-Beblawi 2008). This 
success, however, was followed by a relapse for nearly a decade. While 
high growth rates returned in 2005, the economic upswing was cut 
short just three years later by the global financial crisis. The revolution 
thus took place during an economic downturn, but also after years of  
propaganda that had portrayed Egypt as a strong emerging economy, 
the ‘Tiger on the Nile’.
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A 2011 report by the World Bank’s Social and Economic Group on 
poverty and social welfare in Egypt in 2008/09 gave a comprehensive 
picture of  the evolution of  poverty prior to the revolution.3 The report 
found that poverty declined in Egypt between February 2005 and 
February 2008 due to rapid economic growth, but that high inflation 
during this period had damaging effects on the poorest. Poverty and 
near poverty declined by some 20 per cent in this rapid-growth period, 
but extreme poverty (defined as the inability to meet basic food needs) 
increased by nearly 20 per cent due to rising inflation and food prices, 
which eroded the purchasing power of  the Egyptian pound. But the 
sudden economic slowdown of  2008/09 amid rapid inflation erased the 
gains made in reducing poverty in the previous period. 
By the end of  2008, the standard of  living of  the poor and near poor, 
which had been rising, again began to decline due to the economic 
recession, with the crisis creating additional tension due to its impact on 
labour demand. As a result, poverty increased markedly between 2008 
and 2009. Despite a decrease in the proportion of  absolute poverty 
between 2005 and 2008, extreme poverty and absolute poverty increased 
from 2004/05 to 2008/09. In 2008/09 some 1.5 million Egyptians 
suffered extreme food poverty, about double the number in 2004/05, 
and absolute poverty rose from 19.6 per cent to 22 per cent. In contrast, 
the rate of  near poverty dropped from 21 per cent before 2004/05 to 
19.2 per cent in 2008/09, as many of  that cohort moved into the ranks of  
the poor. According to this analysis, in 2008/09 31 million Egyptians, or 
nearly 40 per cent of  the population, were poor or near poor. 
The economic fluctuations especially affected vulnerable populations. 
A detailed comparison of  labour rates and poverty in 2004/05 and 
2008/09 shows that many of  the poor were marginalised in the 
period of  growth because they had little involvement in the most 
rapidly growing sectors. Rising food prices and other economic shocks 
exacerbated the impact. Workers in the informal sector and those with 
low levels of  education sustained long-term damage, as further cuts to 
already depressed incomes pushed many working families into poverty. 
The crisis harmed families with children the most, especially those 
supporting large families, and families that relied on remittances from 
abroad. Poverty increased in rural Upper Egypt to its highest levels 
since 1995/96. Indeed, extreme poverty was concentrated in the rural 
south. At the same time, sluggish job creation limited the opportunities 
available to migrant workers from densely populated rural areas. 
The loss of  a job during the crisis year was the principal reason for 
families falling into poverty. A comparison of  family data in February 
2008 and February 2009 found that decreased employment rates in the 
family were responsible for more than one-third of  cases of  poverty 
(people who were newly poor). Moreover, policies designed to help 
families bear the impact of  the crisis were inadequate to prevent more 
poverty. During the crisis, Egypt greatly expanded its food subsidy 
system and increased bread subsidies. According to World Bank data,4 
120 | Rezk The Political Economy of Violence in Egypt
Vol. 47 No. 3 May 2016: ‘Ruptures and Ripple Effects in the Middle East and Beyond’
without this expansion the poverty rate would have been at least three 
points higher, but this support was not targeted at those in need and 
was extremely costly (at least 1 per cent of  GDP). Cash social aid 
programmes were expanded as well and helped some of  the poor to 
avoid extreme poverty, but the impact was too slight to have any clear 
effect on national rates. 
The rate of  chronic or near chronic poverty in Egypt is about half  the 
total poverty rate. The food crisis of  mid-2008 sent about 6 per cent 
of  the population into the ranks of  the poor for the first time, while 
others were driven into poverty due to the loss of  their jobs. Data from 
February 2009 indicate that the newly poor were younger than the 
chronic poor and were more likely to be non-agricultural workers. 
According to the World Bank study, the crisis exposed a major 
weakness in the social welfare system in Egypt. The study found that 
the food crisis, combined with the impact of  the global economic crisis, 
temporarily stalled and indeed reversed progress made on anti-poverty 
efforts in 2005–08, indicating that the comprehensive subsidy system 
could not protect families from shocks. The crisis showed that Egypt did 
not have a social safety net that offered adequate protection to the poor 
or those at risk of  poverty in the event of  an external crisis. 
The food subsidy regime played a crucial role in maintaining standards 
of  living, but because of  its comprehensiveness, it can only minimally 
defray the impact on the poor of  rising food prices. The report found that 
were it not for food subsidies, the poverty rate in Egypt in 2008/09 would 
have been 31 per cent rather than 22 per cent, based on 2008/09 prices. 
Inflation rates continued to rise, especially for major foodstuffs that 
constituted the bulk of  expenditure for the poor and those with limited 
income. The Egyptian Central Bank in September 2010 noted that 
monthly inflation for August 2010 reached 2.85 per cent, bringing the 
annual rate (September 2009–August 2010) to nearly 11 per cent. More 
seriously, the biggest part of  the monthly increase was attributable to 
food prices that were continuing to rise due to limited supply, especially 
of  red meat, poultry, vegetables, fruits, rice, and vegetable oil.
According to the Central Bank statement, increases in the prices of  
vegetables and fruits for the second month in a row bumped up the 
monthly inflation rate. The price of  poultry increased 30 per cent 
from January 2010 to the end of  August, while the price of  red meat 
rose nearly 25 per cent in the same period. The price of  rice increased 
43.5 per cent from May to the end of  August, while fruits and vegetables 
went up 10 per cent in the month of  August alone. These increases 
accounted for 79 per cent of  the jump in general inflation that month. 
During this period, for the first time in Egypt violence occurred over 
competition for food. A report issued by the Awlad al-Ard Center 
recorded that 14 people were killed, 190 injured and 137 arrested in 
fighting over bread in the first half  of  2008 (ANHRI 2008). The same 
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scene was repeated, though on a narrower scale, in the summer of  
2010. The press reported on 17 August (Shaath 2010) that a young man 
had been killed in a fight in a bread line at a bakery in Nagaa Hamadi, 
in Qena governorate. Daily newspaper Alsharq Alawsat reported: 
the sight of  lines has again become common with the rarity of  
butane canisters, the price of  which in some areas has risen to LE40, 
although the official price is LE2.70. The crisis has acquired tragic 
dimensions as two people were killed in the scrum to buy canisters 
and citizens suffer in in the exhausting search for them.
2.2 The business elite: monopoly, corruption, cronyism
The perceived corruption of  political and business elites was a key 
driving force behind the 2011 revolution. Berlin-based watchdog 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index showed that in 
the years preceding the revolution Egypt faced increasing corruption 
problems, falling from a rank of  70th out of  158 in 2005 to 115th out of  
180 in 2008 (where first place is least corrupt). Moreover, according to a 
Pew survey (Chekir and Diwan 2012: 2), in 2010 corruption was the top 
concern of  Egyptians with 46 per cent listing it as their main concern, 
ahead of  lack of  democracy and poor economic conditions.
The last government before the revolution was formed on 14 July 2004. It 
included most of  the major businessmen close to Gamal Mubarak, while 
other business leaders held positions in the dominant National Democratic 
Party (NDP) or in one of  the two houses of  Parliament, some of  them 
heading the most important committees in the parliament. Among them 
was Ahmed Ezz, a steel magnate and member of  parliament, whose 
companies dominated Egypt’s steel industry after 2000, controlling up 
to 65 per cent of  the local market at times, and who has been accused 
of  having improperly acquired the largest public steel corporation at 
an artificially low price, generating excess profits, and having lobbied to 
raise external tariffs to gain protection from foreign competition and for 
Parliament to pass watered down anti-monopoly legislation. 
Ezz was a prominent member of  the NDP, a member of  its influential 
Policy Committee, and the chair of  Hosni Mubarak’s election campaign 
in 2005. In Parliament, he was the chair of  the Budget Committee, which 
oversaw the work of  the Competition Commission (Chekir and Diwan 
2012: 2) A second example is Ahmed al-Maghrabi, majority owner of  
Palm Hills, the second-biggest real estate development company in the 
country, and simultaneously minister of  housing. After the revolution he 
was accused of  using his position to sell large tracts of  land at heavily 
discounted prices to his own company and other individuals connected to 
the NDP (ibid.) 
The significance of  crony capitalism is that it excludes businesspeople 
who do not have access to policymakers. Thus many felt that even 
existing market-based, neoliberal policies were not operating as they 
should to encourage efficient products and sideline inefficient ones – the 
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fundamental promise of  neoclassical theory and neoliberal policies. 
A great many businesspeople felt that at a certain point they would either 
turn over some of  their profits to senior politicians or come up against 
an invisible ceiling that would stop them from further advancement, 
regardless of  their capabilities. 
It was therefore no wonder that some took part in the revolution or 
provided logistic support to demonstrators in Tahrir Square, giving 
them medicines or other goods. The prevalent sense was that the door 
of  opportunity was closed even to members of  the upper-middle and 
upper classes who had no connections with the political elite. Moreover, 
as el-Beblawi notes, ‘the private sector failed to establish a credible 
image in the public opinion as a dynamic, creative body. Stories and/
or rumours of  corruption and profiteering undermined its picture in the 
public eyes’ (el-Beblawi 2008: 10). 
2.3 Political dynamics
For all their importance, these economic factors do not by themselves 
explain the 2011 revolution, however; political factors, including 
mobilisation, were also crucial. After the formation of  the government 
under prime minister Ahmed Nazif  in July 2004, supported by Gamal, 
many people realised that the move was laying the groundwork for 
Gamal’s assumption of  power. This in turn prompted the formation of  
the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kefaya), whose defining slogans 
were ‘No to extension’ (the extension of  a new term of  office for Hosni 
Mubarak) and ‘No to inheritance’ (Gamal’s inheritance of  power). 
This was followed by the emergence of  several movements and frequent 
demonstrations, strikes, and protests, whose size and geographic scope 
were unprecedented in Egypt’s history. The protests affected a variety 
of  sectors took, and included civil servants and workers from across the 
country. According to one study, between 2006 and 2009:
more than 1.7 million workers took part in protests, a stark indication 
of  the qualitative leap taken by the labor movement in Egypt. The 
vast majority of  these strikes and actions were organised by labor 
leaders outside the official trade unions, which in many cases workers 
simply abandoned, seeing them as useless’ (Al-Mahdi 2012).
With protests gaining momentum and the opposition becoming 
increasingly vocal, the security apparatus stepped up its activities, and 
many citizens were treated violently in police stations and detention 
facilities. Many of  these incidents were filmed with mobile phone 
cameras and posted on social networking sites, causing much outrage, 
especially among young people. This in turn prompted young protesters 
to set up the ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ Facebook page – named after a 
young man killed by police in Alexandria – which was seen by hundreds 
of  thousands of  people in the run-up to the revolution. 
In addition, the State Security Investigations (SSI) service tightened 
its grip. The SSI received much criticism for its interference in public 
(Endnotes)
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life and attempts to control politics to ensure the regime’s survival. It 
vetted civil service employment at most significant state departments 
and agencies, linking employment to background security reports, and 
it similarly controlled most promotions, also based on security reports 
submitted to decision makers. Moreover, the SSI was in charge of  highly 
sensitive political matters, including sectarian issues, and obstructed the 
activities of  political parties, organisations and movements, either by 
direct harassment in the street or inciting schisms and dissent within their 
ranks. Finally, it kept a hand in the media and various cultural sectors, 
though its influence declined somewhat after 2005 (al-Aasar 2013).
The key political event that perhaps ignited the repertoire of  
accumulated rage, especially among the middle classes, was the People’s 
Assembly (lower house) election on 28 November 2010, with runoffs 
on 5 December, which were flagrantly rigged in a way that surpassed 
the usual fraud by the ruling NDP. While some parties and movements 
boycotted the elections from the outset, others – primarily the Wafd 
and Tagammu parties, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood – fielded 
candidates. Following violence and blatant fraud in the first round, Wafd 
and the Brotherhood, which had won 88 seats in the 2005 parliament, 
or 20 per cent, boycotted the second round. In the final count, the NDP 
won nearly every seat in the assembly. 
Members of  the middle classes, most of  whom did not vote in the 
elections, were nevertheless resentful, perhaps because the fraud was 
conducted in their name. These feelings were stoked further when the 
NDP and the party’s secretary-general, Ezz, the architect of  the fraud, 
took to the pages of  daily newspaper Al-Ahram on 23 and 24 December, 
to write that the results were the natural outcome of  the party’s efforts 
and the unprecedented economic successes the NDP government had 
achieved over the previous five years. The chair of  Al-Ahram pushed 
the same line, most prominently in an article on 10 December, titled 
‘Last Word on the Egyptian Elections’, in which he commented on the 
prevailing response among Egyptians to the election results: 
I could not turn the page and move on to other subjects after 
encountering that outpouring of  anger on the part of  Al-Ahram 
readers in response to my commentaries on the recent parliamentary 
elections. Among the many letters I received, there was not a single 
positive reaction. Admittedly, they represent a relatively narrow 
segment of  the Egyptian people, those members of  the middle class 
who own a computer and act on their urge to comment on the 
articles they read, whether in Arabic or English, but they form a very 
proactive and vibrant segment (Said 2010). 
Moreover, Mubarak further incensed the public when, during the 
inauguration of  the new session of  Parliament on 19 December, 
commented on the move by members of  the political factions and 
former parliamentary candidates to create a shadow parliament saying, 
‘Let them have their fun.’ 
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Finally, one cannot deny that the uprising in Tunisia, the popular overthrow 
of  Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January 2011, was a contributing factor. 
It inspired the hope among young Egyptians in particular that the people 
could change their leaders and the state of  the country. 
All of  these events motivated many to respond to the appeal to 
demonstrate on 25 January. Following violence against protesters, the 
crowds were bigger on 28 January, the ‘Day of  Rage’, and there was 
a willingness to meet that violence with counter-violence. The events 
leading up to the uprising also prompted a very broad coalition of  
people to join the demonstrations that brought down the regime, a 
coalition that included businesspeople, the middle classes, unemployed 
young people, and poor workers and farmers. According to al-Mahdi: 
The people that staged the revolution were not only the middle- and 
upper-class youth in Tahrir Square who wanted another president. 
Young and old people in Cairo, Suez, Beni Soueif, and Arish also 
took part. These people did not want to die in lines for bread, water, 
or hospitals, be arbitrarily abused by police, or be forced to remove 
their children from schools so they could work to make ends meet 
(Al-Mahdi 2012: 218).
2.4 Revolutionary violence
Despite widespread claims that the revolution was peaceful – which 
perhaps initially helped broaden and diversify the base of  supporters 
and delegitimised security forces’ violent interference – the turn to 
violence in fact happened quite rapidly. Some young people used 
violence as a means to counter police violence, particularly on the Day 
of  Rage. Groups of  protesters also set fire to police stations, burning 
down 99 in total, and NDP offices (al-Aasar 2012). 
Events evolved in an entirely unexpected direction. When the police 
apparatus collapsed on 28 January, security officials turned to their ‘plan 
B’, opening the prisons and releasing criminals. The same night, several 
shopping malls were looted and automated cash machines robbed. 
Some claim that police officers directly supervised these crimes, and 
while this is unverified, it is certain that the police showed no interest 
in stopping them. Other events followed that were tantamount to a 
campaign to terrify citizens and encourage them to remain at home. 
People were frightened by the prospect of  roving gangs breaking into 
homes, and several false appeals for help were heard, particularly using 
women on television and radio news. 
People’s response, however, was unexpected: they quickly formed 
neighbourhood watch committees to guard their homes and shops, 
searching cars on the streets and even directing traffic. For the 
first time, they disregarded the curfew that had been in place since 
28 January and remained in the streets, guarding their homes and 
shops throughout the night. Revolutionary committees were set up 
at the entrances to Tahrir Square to guard against security forces 
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and hired thugs. It thus became apparent that Egyptian citizens were 
prepared to fight violence with violence, which brought a rapid end to 
the organised wave of  terror and panic.
The next step regime supporters (or the counter-revolution) took came 
in the ‘Battle of  the Camel’, when prominent pro-regime businessmen, 
NDP leaders, and members of  parliament paid thugs to use violence 
to remove the revolutionaries from the square. In an ugly attempt to 
justify the violent incursion, some said that the assailants were mostly 
informal day labourers who had lost their livelihoods in the week 
from 25 January to 1 February. In other words, they sought to portray 
events as civil strife that had resulted from the deteriorating economic 
conditions of  citizens who rejected the uprising and wanted to reinstate 
security and the regime. This plan and its justification failed, as the 
revolutionaries stood their ground; at least 11 people were killed in the 
ensuing violence and more than 2,000 were injured. 
The 18-day uprising ended with the fall of  the Mubarak regime and 
SCAF’s assumption of  rule on 11 February. Although some hoped to 
achieve the revolution’s objectives peacefully and build the country 
on more equitable foundations, events did not move in this direction. 
Indeed, the first outcome of  the revolution was the dissolution of  the 
broad-based coalition that made it: 
When the protestors occupied Tahrir Square, first on January 25 
and later on January 28, their unified slogan was ‘the people want 
to overthrow the regime.’ This ingenious slogan reflected an ad-hoc 
agreement among groups that all wanted to change the system of  
governance, but not necessarily in systemic ways that would endanger 
their interests. Others wanted more systemic change to protect their 
class interests against exploitation. While many of  the protestors 
were part of  the broad hegemonic elite, most of  them came from 
the exploited classes. There was thus a momentary union between 
the upper and middle class and the working classes – a union that 
did not last long. After Mubarak was ousted, the media and parts of  
the middle class began to condemn ongoing strikes by the working 
class, accusing the strikers of  advancing ‘selfish, parochial demands’ 
(Al-Mahdi 2012: 230).
The first post-uprising protests centred on the demands of  workers, 
especially in various parts of  the civil service. These demands included 
making temporary appointments permanent, wage increases, and 
wage parity for all workers in the same government body with the same 
educational qualifications, a particularly strident demand given existing 
wage gaps unrelated to competence or merit.
Overall, the explosion and continuation of  violence that confounded 
everyone’s expectations can be attributed to two primary factors. First, 
some of  those surprised by the continuation of  the revolution scrambled 
to contain it within the narrowest bounds possible. From the outset, 
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they focused on saluting the noble, non-partisan, non-ideological 
youth who made the revolution, as if  a lack of  ideology were somehow 
praiseworthy and not, instead, the result of  decades of  moribund 
politics and gagging of  the opposition. This stress on non-ideological 
youth signalled a fear of  youth politicisation, especially after political 
awareness and participation increased to levels not seen in Egypt for 
some 60 years. 
Second, as it became easier to establish political groups, dozens of  parties 
were formed, along with perhaps hundreds of  revolutionary and youth 
coalitions. Thus were the various groups that took part in the revolution 
fragmented, with the exception of  the ever-cohesive Muslim Brotherhood. 
That the Salafis and their fledgling party later won a substantial bloc of  
votes in the parliamentary elections came as a surprise to all, but they 
too soon splintered, while as a whole the Islamist movement was divided 
among several parties. In addition, most Egyptians were not involved in 
any political organisation or direct political action, but instead responded 
to competing forces’ appeals according to their own historical sensibility 
or because of  changes the revolution had made to their lives. As Richani 
notes, ‘Violence increases when the prevailing institutions fail to mediate 
among the various antagonistic forces unleashed by the socioeconomic 
and political change’ (Richani 1997: 37). The outcome of  the political 
instability and security was a spike in political and social violence unseen 
in Egypt in the past century. 
3 Towards the 2013 uprising
The political instability and lack of  security impeded attempts to revive 
the economy. A vicious circle thus developed whereby the worsening 
economy led to greater instability and lack of  security and vice-versa. 
Economic growth had fallen to around 2 per cent since January 2011, 
less than the population growth rate, which led to a decline in the 
standard of  living, with the drop being steeper and faster for the poor. 
Other problems, such as rising unemployment, exacerbated the impact 
of  poor growth. 
In addition, the state racked up a large, persistent budget deficit and a 
sizeable deficit in the balance of  payments, leading to declining foreign 
currency reserves at the Central Bank and an erosion of  the value 
of  the Egyptian pound. Foreign investments also dried up, including 
indirect investment in stock portfolios and foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and revenues from tourism plummeted as foreign tourists stayed 
away. Moreover, there were supply crises, in fuel, for example, and 
a deterioration of  basic services, including electricity blackouts and 
interruptions of  public transport, such as the railways, both of  which had 
repercussions for production and worker productivity (Al-Samhouri 2012). 
Unemployment and poverty are perhaps the two most serious 
socioeconomic issues that require clear, effective solutions because they 
have the most direct impact on the ability of  any regime or political or 
social coalition to stabilise the political situation and provide security. 
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3.1 Unemployment in Egypt: manifestations and causes
According to the quarterly CAPMAS labour force survey, by the end 
of  March 2013 unemployment stood at 13.2 per cent, with 3.6 million 
people unemployed out of  a labour force of  27.2 million. In March 
2010, by contrast, unemployment was 9.1 per cent, with 2.4 million 
unemployed. The total number of  unemployed people had increased 
by 50 per cent – 1.2 million – in just three years, leading to an 
increase in the unemployment rate from 9.1 per cent in March 2010 
to 13.2 per cent in March 2013. According to the labour survey, the 
economy was only created 157,000 jobs during 2012/13, while an 
additional 200,000 people joined the unemployment rolls during the 
same period.5 
Unemployment in Egypt has several distinct features, many of  which 
existed prior to the revolution:
 l It is concentrated among youth. Young people aged 15–29 make 
up 82 per cent of  the unemployed. Among the 20–24 age cohort, 
unemployment stands at 42.3 per cent. This is linked with the second 
feature of  unemployment.
 l Unemployment largely affects the educated. Those with an 
intermediate, above intermediate, or university education constitute 
70.7 per cent of  the unemployed. 
 l Unemployment is much higher among women (25 per cent) than 
men (9.7 per cent).
The jump in unemployment is, as noted above, attributable to low 
growth rates and depressed economic activity as investment rates 
declined after the 2011 revolution. The 2010/11 Annual Report of  the 
Central Bank (Central Bank 2012) noted a 1.8 per cent bump in GDP, 
compared to a 5.1 per cent increase in 2009/10 (ibid.) This deterioration 
in economic growth was due to the events and developments that 
accompanied the January 25 revolution, which led to a negative growth 
rate of  4.2 per cent in the third quarter (January–March 2011). As 
a result, according to CAPMAS data, unemployment increased to 
11.8 per cent by the end of  June 2011. 
While the economy saw a slight improvement the next year (2011/12), 
as growth climbed to 2.1 per cent (Central Bank 2013), the rate 
was still far too low to absorb new entrants into the labour market, 
let alone make a dent in existing unemployment. In consequence, 
unemployment rose again, from 11.8 per cent in June 2011 to 12.6 per 
cent in June 2012. Economic growth rates remained low during 
2012/13, at around 2.1 per cent, and unemployment continued to 
climb, reaching 13 per cent by the end of  2012, 13.2 per cent by March 
2013, and an estimated 13.3 per cent by the end of  the fiscal year in 
June 2013, which coincided with the end of  the rule of  Morsi and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
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3.2 Poverty in post-revolution Egypt
According to CAPMAS, the most salient features of  poverty in Egypt 
between the uprisings were that:
 l Some 25.2 per cent of  the population lived below the national poverty 
line and 4.8 per cent lived in extreme poverty (2010/11). The poverty 
line was defined as monthly per capita expenditure of  less than 
256 Egyptian pounds, or a little less than US$1.50 a day using 2010/11 
prices. This threshold was closer to capturing poverty than the extreme 
poverty line used by the World Bank, set at US$1.25 per day. In Egypt, 
extreme poverty was defined as monthly per capita expenditure of  less 
than 172 Egyptian pounds, or less than US$1 a day, which was lower 
than the international line. The high poverty line was set at per capita 
monthly expenditure of  334 Egyptian pounds, or about US$1.80 a day, 
compared to a global high poverty line of  less than US$2.25 per day. If  
the global measure is used, which includes the poor, extreme poor and 
near poor, then 42 per cent of  the population is poor. 
 l Poverty was concentrated geographically, with higher rates in 
Upper Egypt. Using the national poverty line, poverty was highest 
in Assyout governorate, where 69 per cent of  the population was 
poor. It was followed by Sohag (59 per cent), Aswan (54 per cent), 
Qena (51 per cent), Fayyoum (41 per cent), Luxor (39 per cent), Beni 
Soueif  (38 per cent), and Minya (32 per cent).
 l Unemployment was indisputably a prime cause of  this increase in 
poverty. Egypt required annual investments of  28 per cent of  GDP to 
absorb new entrants into the labour market and avoid adding to the 
pool of  existing unemployment and poverty. 
3.3 The informal sector: a source of livelihood tipping into violence
The most significant result of  the rapid increase in unemployment after 
2011 was that the unemployed turned to the informal sector, seen most 
visibly in the explosion of  street peddlers and itinerant vendors. While 
Tahrir Square was, for the revolutionaries and the world, the site of  the 
revolution, for a great many unemployed young people it represented 
a huge market and an opportunity to make a living. In the absence 
of  police, a constant source of  trouble for vendors, the square was a 
boon. According to Okasha, stability and an end to conflict with the 
police and army was not in the vendors’ interest; the revolution gave 
them room to exercise pent-up liberties and make a living without fear 
of  police harassment (Okasha 2012). In fact, the situation evolved in 
a different direction. Peddlers sprang up in the streets of  Cairo and all 
over Egypt, adapting themselves and their role to the political situation. 
Vendors first began to use violence against attempts to eject them 
from Tahrir and other squares and streets. The violence was initially 
deployed with the approval of  revolutionaries faced with attempts by the 
police and army to evacuate public squares. Violence was also at times 
seen between vendors and thugs, who attempted to collect protection 
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money, and peddlers themselves came into violent conflict over turf  in 
more than one place in Cairo and elsewhere in Egypt. 
The remarkable development was the speed with which the position of  
street vendors evolved and their flexible alliances with various parties 
depending on their interests. Initially, they joined the revolutionaries 
against the evacuation of  the square. Later, when their conditions had 
stabilised somewhat and police left them to peddle their wares in peace, 
they allied with police against revolutionaries. Vendors on July 26 Street 
confronted a march of  revolutionary Ultras and the Black Bloc on 
3 May 2013. Following clashes between the two sides, the demonstrators 
retreated to Talaat Harb Square and from there to Tahrir. 
Skirmishes had also occurred between vendors and protesters in support 
of  the judiciary on 26 April. Vendors around the High Court threw stones 
at demonstrators, accusing them of  interrupting their business. These 
are just two examples of  the attitudes of  vendors during Morsi’s tenure. 
Peddlers were also present in Raba’a and Nahda Squares during the 
occupation by the Muslim Brotherhood and their Islamist allies in June–
August 2014. After Morsi’s removal, they began to confront Brotherhood 
protesters in Cairo and several governorates, especially Daqahliya and 
Sharqiya, usually in clashes that involved weapons on both sides. 
The passage of  time and persistent lack of  security have led peddlers 
to recognise their weight and importance, and they have sought to 
establish a union to speak on their behalf  with other political forces. 
Indeed, the executive began to understand and appreciate the value of  
the violence used by street sellers – who tended to be apolitical – against 
their political enemies. ‘Solving the problem of  street sellers requires 
deliberation and humanity. Instead of  confronting them, what is needed 
is understanding, dialogue, and communication,’ Al-Youm al-Sabia 
reported Governor of  Cairo Galal al-Said as saying on 28 September. 
The same story went on to say that he had tasked the deputy governor 
for the western zone with forming a field committee to find solutions 
to deal with the street vendors and come up with ways to absorb their 
numbers in mutually satisfactory ways. 
The governor also noted that the peddlers had played a patriotic role in 
standing up to the riots by the Muslim Brotherhood during the events 
at the Fath Mosque in Ramsis (Al-Youm al-Sabia 2013b). Yet, even as 
street peddlers confronted political forces to defend their interests, they 
declared their readiness to confront any other force, including executive 
bodies, in defence of  these same interests. Al-Youm al-Sabia on 7 October 
reported that street vendors in Ezbat Abu Hashish, near the Ghamra 
Bridge in Hadayeq al-Qubba, had warned the governor and executive 
agencies in the area not to confiscate their wares on Port Said Street, 
saying ‘It’s over our dead bodies if  anyone comes near here to take our 
goods. We’re ready to fight the entire republic.’ They stressed that the 
goods were the sole source of  their livelihoods (Al-Youm al-Sabia 2013a). 
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In short, the revolution and the security vacuum gave rise to many 
activities, either in response to opportunities or to mitigate deteriorating 
economic conditions, but in either case, they were predicated on 
violence or at least the willingness and ability to use it. These activities 
were primarily of  two types: one criminal and illicit, including weapons- 
and drug-trafficking, theft and armed robbery; and the other licit, 
namely the expansion of  the informal sector, which had resulted from 
declines in investment opportunities, economic growth, and the ability 
of  the economy to create jobs in the formal sector. Political instability 
and a deteriorating economy continued to pose the greatest challenge to 
those in power, whether under the SCAF or during the tenure of  Morsi 
and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
It is not in the scope of  this article to address issues such as youth, 
sectarian or Islamist violence and their trajectories under the SCAF 
and Morsi. Instead it examines how the political economy was a factor 
in citizens’ response to the Tamarod movement6 and the protests by 
millions all over Egypt seeking to remove Morsi and the Brotherhood 
from power. 
3.4 Presidential elections and broken political promises
The first round of  the presidential election on 23 and 24 May 2012 
revealed a substantial shift in voting patterns compared to the 
parliamentary elections a year earlier. Morsi, the candidate for the 
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of  the Muslim 
Brotherhood, came in first place with 5,446,460 votes (24.9 per cent), 
followed by Ahmed Shafiq with 5,338,285 votes (24.5 per cent), Hamdin 
Sabahi with 4,616,937 votes (21.1 per cent), and Abd al-Meneim Abu 
al-Futouh with 3,889,195 votes (17.8 per cent). 
The Brotherhood realised the precarious nature of  its position, given 
the very slim gap between Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq, his opponent 
in the run-off. In fact, the total votes received by liberal and leftist 
candidates, known more generally as the civil current (Hamdin Sabahi, 
Amr Moussa, Khaled Ali, Abu al-Ezz al-Hariri, Hisham al-Bastawisi, 
Ahmed Shafiq, and other marginal candidates) far outweighed those 
won by the Islamist current (Mohammed Selim al-Awa, Abd al-Meneim 
Abu al-Futouh, and Mohamed Morsi). The Brotherhood took action to 
secure sufficient votes for its candidate in the second round by making 
promises and electoral agreements with representatives of  the civil 
camp, who rejected Shafiq as a representative of  the ancien regime. 
The most prominent of  these agreements, the Fairmont agreement 
– named after the hotel where the agreement was reached – was 
concluded between Morsi and representatives of  political factions. 
According to some who were involved, the agreement was finally 
reached after seven hours of  negotiations. Perhaps the most significant 
aspect of  the agreement was its affirmation of  a national partnership 
and inclusive national project that would give a voice to the revolution’s 
goals and all segments of  Egyptian society, including women, Copts, 
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and young people. It was agreed that the presidential team and a 
national salvation government would include representatives of  all 
national trends, with the prime minister being an independent national 
figure. The newly formed government soon made it apparent, however, 
that Morsi was not meeting the terms of  the agreement as president. 
Soon after, Morsi issued a constitutional declaration on 22 November, 
which set his decrees above judicial review and immunised the Shura 
Council (upper house), in which the Brotherhood held a majority, and 
Islamist-dominated People’s Assembly (lower house). The declaration 
outraged everyone, including the president’s advisory team, which was 
formed to mollify the national forces. The declaration made it clear 
that the advisory body was simply a facade and that the president’s true 
advisers were Brotherhood members, and several non-Brotherhood 
advisers resigned. Morsi’s declaration sparked off widespread protests, 
and counter-protests by his supporters, that left two people dead and 
hundreds injured. 
A major turning point arrived when armed Brotherhood militias on 
5 December attacked protesters who were staging a sit-in in front of  the 
Ittihadiya Presidential Palace, setting off clashes in which seven people 
were shot dead and hundreds injured. The president’s supporters also 
detained several people, questioning and torturing them. The events 
at Ittihadiya set in motion a massive response over the next few days in 
various Egyptian provinces. According to estimates, more than 1 million 
took part in the demonstrations on 7 December in protest. 
Perhaps more important was the position of  the majority who were 
not directly involved in political action, but simply watched events 
unfold. As time passed, a great number of  Egyptians, particularly those 
unaffiliated to any political force, realised that the Brotherhood betrayal 
not only affected political forces that had made an agreement with the 
president, but themselves as well. Citizens faced numerous hardships in 
this period, from problems in obtaining butane canisters and diesel, to 
regular blackouts, piles of  rubbish in the streets, and acute traffic jams, 
all of  which the president had promised to resolve in his first 100 days 
in office (before he had made his constitutional declaration). Nor did 
the general citizenry feel that any of  the economic promises in the 
president’s platform had been fulfilled. 
3.5 Ambitious promises, constrained reality7
Morsi’s presidential platform had addressed all aspects of  economic, 
social, and political life in Egypt, but more than three-quarters was 
devoted to issues of  social justice and economic development. This 
reflected a society whose electorate complained of  economic problems 
and low standards of  living, and where more than 40 per cent of  the 
population lived below or near the poverty line. The platform assumed 
prominence because the Muslim Brotherhood publicised it as the plan 
of  action that would bring about a major transformation in people’s 
lives. It created enormous expectations, as people awaited the rolling 
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out of  the platform to meet their heightened aspirations. The most 
significant aspects of  the platform are outlined below.
First, the platform clearly embraced a market economy, in which the 
private sector would play the largest role in realising economic and social 
development. In a Reuters interview in October 2011 Brotherhood-
affiliated businessman Hassan Malek said that the economic policies 
pursued under Mubarak had been moving in the right direction, but 
were marred by rampant corruption and cronyism. Malek said that the 
future of  investment in Egypt depended on the private sector and skilled 
labour. He also said that he supported the decisions former minister of  
trade and industry Rashid Mohammed Rashid had made, who worked 
to liberalise industry and attract more foreign direct investment, adding 
that the government must eliminate corruption and cronyism if  it was to 
achieve development and growth (Awad 2011).
There was no problem with the presidential platform declaring its 
preference for a market economy; some may even have seen it as a good 
thing, insofar as it would entail no shake-up in the existing economic 
order that might provoke unrest or instability harmful to economic 
development and growth. The problem was that the platform offered no 
real explanation of  how Morsi would rid the economy of  corruption and 
cronyism, with the exception of  a glancing reference to ‘enforcing the law 
protecting competition and preventing monopolistic practices, to prevent 
a group of  companies or monopolies from imposing high prices for goods 
and services.’ The same reference was made elsewhere in the platform. 
Indeed, an existing law ostensibly protected competition and prevented 
monopolistic practices, but that did not prevent the rise of  monopolies 
that had distorted the market, a fact well known to all. Morsi’s platform 
gave no indication of  whether he was satisfied with the law and only 
sought to enforce it, or whether he had reservations about the law itself. 
The lack of  a clear stance on this issue in the platform may have raised 
doubts about the depth of  change the new regime was committed to. 
It appeared to be merely a matter of  bringing in a new set of  cronies 
and interests to replace the discredited clique. In turn, this did not 
constitute a genuine revolution to reshape the economic system and 
its administration, even within the framework of  a market economy. 
Instead, change was reduced to a conflict of  business elites, with a new 
set of  elites moving into favoured positions. 
For example, Hassan Malek was selected to act as a bridge between 
the business sector and the presidency. Malek formed the Egyptian 
Association for Business Development and also selected the businessmen 
who would accompany the president on his trips abroad. This provoked 
objections from some businesspeople, who believed that a new clique 
of  cronies was simply replacing the old regime’s cronies. In a workshop 
that the Carnegie Middle East Center and Partners in Development 
organised in Cairo on 8 November 2012, businessmen Mohammed Nour 
and Mohammed Qassem expressed their dissatisfaction with Malek’s 
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association, which they said was clearly involved in partisan battles, given 
its alliance with the current president. Questioning the association’s 
mission, they dismissed it as just another example of  businessmen seeking 
to trade on their connections to the ruling party for privileges for their 
industries and to marginalise competitors (Said and Al-Qita’ 2013).
Second, the platform was filled with fine-sounding but extremely 
ambitious goals. Under a heading titled ‘Objectives of  the Economic 
Program’ the platform aimed at ‘reducing current inflation levels of  
11 per cent annually to less than half  of  the annual growth rate’. With 
annual growth set at 7 per cent on average, the goal was thus to cut 
inflation to 3.5 per cent annually (or 5.5 percentage points if  the goal is to 
halve current inflation rates). The platform also strove to ‘cut the budget 
deficit by 20 per cent annually’ and ‘balance the deficit in the balance 
of  payments by the end of  2016/17’, ‘increase foreign currency reserves 
to a level that insulates the Egyptian economy against any economic 
fluctuations’, ‘reduce domestic and external debt by 15 per cent annually’, 
‘cut unemployment to less than 7 per cent by early 2016’, ‘double the 
number of  beneficiaries of  social security pensions, from 1.5 million to 
3 million by the end of  the program’, and ‘reduce poverty rates’. 
Other objectives given elsewhere in the platform included plans to 
‘increase health expenditure to 12 per cent of  GDP by the end of  
the presidential term’, to ‘affirm the state’s guarantees for full health 
insurance without a minimum burden’; to ‘raise the minimum pension 
benefit, adopt an annual increase sufficient to cover price increases, and 
set a ceiling on pensions’; and to ‘gradually double the education budget 
to bring it up to global rates and increase allocations for scientific 
research to reach 2.5 per cent of  national income’. 
The platform committed to ‘redistributing income to achieve social 
justice and guaranteeing that every person receives enough to meet the 
minimum threshold of  life’s needs by setting a minimum and maximum 
wage and changing the current wage structure to make the basic 
wage the foundation of  one’s salary and base incentives and rewards 
on performance.’ The platform did not specify the minimum and 
maximum wage levels to be adopted, however, and this in a platform 
filled with numbers and percentages and in the midst of  a real social 
debate about such levels.
While no one would disagree with such ambitious goals in principle, 
the question was how they might be realised. What policies and 
mechanisms would be adopted to meet them, especially because the 
platform set clear quantitative targets to be met in a limited timeframe? 
In fact, the platform included precious little clarification in this regard, 
especially in terms of  government policies, though when discussing the 
economic role of  the state, the platform alluded to restructuring the 
state’s role to make its two priorities fighting corruption and drafting 
economic policies (fiscal, monetary, and commercial). 
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The platform contained stark inconsistencies. In a section on fiscal policy, 
it supported ‘an incremental program to reduce the budget deficit to less 
than 6 per cent by early 2016’, which directly contradicted the target 
noted above of  slashing the deficit by 20 per cent annually. The platform’s 
proposed fiscal policy included ‘a short- to medium-term plan to rationalise 
government spending, reconsider the tax code to ensure an equitable tax 
burden, and review the subsidy system to ensure it reaches the deserving.’ 
This section of  the platform noted: ‘The most important features of  any fiscal 
policy is the attempt to create a climate that fosters a dynamic private sector 
and generates strong growth, jobs, progress, and development in Egypt.’ No 
specific tax policy was explored or adopted, however, a remarkable omission 
in a platform so full of  numbers and figures. The section only noted that: 
in terms of  revenues, tax policy must focus on activating a tax 
structure consistent with international and regional standards that 
promotes business competition and cuts tax rates for small and 
medium businesses, which will bring in more tax revenue overall. 
In the event, of  course, these goals could not be realised. The platform’s 
hopes were that preservation of  the existing tax structure (and tax 
cuts for some sectors) combined with increased domestic and foreign 
investment would increase overall economic activity, and that this 
in turn would enable the elimination of  the deficit within five years. 
The Brotherhood and FJP leaders issued statements suggesting that 
Egypt had received promises of  FDI from multinational corporations 
amounting about US$200bn over five years, or US$40bn a year, which 
exceeded the required level of  investment (US$33bn the first year). 
While campaigning in Nasr City on 6 May 2012, Morsi said that the 
government had held negotiations with several companies to bring in 
this level of  investment, and the acting presidential spokesman said on 
27 June that some US$200bn in foreign investment would be pumped 
into the economy in the coming period. But this was wholly unrealistic. 
Foreign investment flows to Egypt between 2005 and 2010 (the best 
years for FDI in Egypt) were only US$49.6bn. In fact, total FDI in 
Egypt from 1970 to 2010 was no more than US$73.1bn. That is, in four 
decades, Egypt had received only 36 per cent of  the investments it was 
ostensibly to receive in just five years. 
During Morsi’s year in office, the government made no progress towards 
any of  the major objectives cited in the platform or the target growth 
rate of  7 per cent needed to reduce unemployment and improve living 
standards. FDI inflows into Egypt from July 2012 to March 2013 
totalled US$6.9bn, falling slightly short of  the US$7.1bn in FDI in the 
same period the previous year. Assuming that the target was $30bn for 
nine months, FDI was only 23 per cent of  the target promised in the 
president’s platform. According to data from the Ministry of  Planning, 
growth reached only 2.1 per cent during Morsi’s tenure, compared to the 
target of  7 per cent. As a result, unemployment was up by 0.8 per cent 
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in late June 2013, reaching 13.3 per cent, compared to 12.5 per cent in 
June 2012, instead of  dropping 1.5 per cent as promised by the platform 
(Ministry of  Planning 2013; Central Bank of  Egypt 2014). It was not 
only these objective conditions, but also the disillusionment arising from 
unrealised promises, that underpinned Morsi’s overthrow. 
4 Conclusion
An examination of  the political economy drivers that contributed to 
people reaching a tipping point prior to the 2011 and 2013 uprisings 
shows that the economic situation continued to decline throughout this 
period. But in both instances, it was when people felt that the political 
handling of  the economic situation was so unbearable that they reached 
a tipping point. Both regimes pursued neoliberal policies. But in 2011, 
it was the increasing sense of  indignation among the middle classes 
and poor over political corruption in the management of  economic 
resources, with no prospect of  improvement, that drove people 
eventually to protest. And in 2013, it was the scale of  disappointment 
at the unmet aspirations for change, and the disconnect between the 
promises of  betterment and the dire economic situation on the ground 
that convinced people of  the need to search for an alternative. 
Mubarak pursued a neoliberal policy whose benefits were reaped by 
a small business elite. Such a policy led to an increase in poverty and 
unemployment on an unprecedented scale, and the informal sector 
became the only avenue for job opportunities, which were incompatible 
with the aspirations of  graduates of  tertiary and intermediary level 
education. These factors worked in constellation with growing political 
corruption, in particular with respect to the inheritance of  power from 
Mubarak to his son, and the practices of  the ruling party that led to the 
disenfranchisement of  the middle classes, while the poor fought – and were 
killed – lining up for bread and cooking gas, basic services deteriorated. 
The Muslim Brotherhood did not oppose Mubarak’s neoliberal policies, 
only the levels of  corruption that characterised his last years in office. 
Consequently, the Brotherhood pursued the same economic policies, but 
replaced Mubarak’s men with their own group of  businessmen who would 
endorse and support their regime. Under the Brotherhood’s rule, Morsi 
adopted policies that the opposition perceived as highly exclusionary, but 
also led to a sense of  unmet aspirations among ordinary citizens who 
were expecting improved livelihoods under the ‘Renaissance’ (Al-Nahda) 
project. Instead, they continued to experience difficulty in accessing energy 
and did not see any improvement in their economic situation. 
When leading Brotherhood member Khayrat el-Shatter announced 
that Al-Nahda was a set of  ideas open for discussion and debate rather 
than guiding an action plan for implementation, people lost trust in 
the Brotherhood’s ability and commitment to deliver on its promises. 
At that point people became responsive to the Tamarod movement’s 
petition to withdraw trust from Morsi and support the idea of  bringing 
forward the presidential election and removing him from power. 
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Notes
1 See for example www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/
five-years-on-security-and-economy and http://carnegie-mec.
org/2016/01/21/chasing-egypt-s-economic-tail/it1c 
2 See, for example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004).
3 I rely exclusively on the executive summary of  the World Bank report 
issued in June 2011 (World Bank 2011). 
4 Ibid.
5 Some claim that real unemployment far exceeds the official rate. In 
that year, 357,000 joined the ranks of  the unemployed, on top of  the 
700,000 new entrants who join the market every year. This suggests 
a clear contradiction in the data on employment in the years leading 
up to the revolution; see El-Erian (2012).
6 A youth-led movement that drew up a petition to call for an early 
presidential election on account of  the failure Morsi’s government 
to deliver on its promises, and which was one of  the movements that 
called on people to take part in a mass uprising against the Muslim 
Brotherhood regime on the occasion of  its first anniversary in office.
7 References to the content of  Morsi’s presidential platform come from 
Sobhi (2012). 
References
Abd al-Fuadoueil, Mahmoud (2013), ‘al-Muham al-‘ajila li-hall al-
ikhtinaqat fi al-iqtisad al-Misri’, al-Shorouk, 17 February
Al-Aasar, Hani (2013) Jihaz al-shurta: tahdid al-mushkilat wa ru’ya li al-
islah, Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 21 October, 
http://acpss.ahramdigital.org.eg/News.aspx?Serial=148 (accessed 
16 March 2016)
Al-Aasar, Hani (2012) al-Unf  al-siyasi fi Misr min isqat Mubarak ila 
muwajahat Mursi, Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 
http://acpss.ahramdigital.org.eg/News.aspx?Serial=118#.
UVLOrNRrLPI.facebook (accessed 16 March 2016)
Al-Mahdi, Rabab (012) ‘Didd al-tahmish: al-‘ummal wa al-shabab wa 
al-tabaqa fi thawrat 25 yanayir,’ in Habib Ayeb and Ray Bush (eds), 
Marginality and Exclusion, London: Zed Books: 226
al-Samhouri, Mohammed (2012) Makhawif  taqashshufiya: hal tanjah 
mufawadat Misr li al-husul ‘ala qard sunduq al-naqd?, Regional Center 
for Strategic Studies, Cairo, 28 August, http://rcssmideast.org/
التحليلات/القضايا-الأقتصادية/مخاوف-تقشفية.html 
Alsharq Alawsat (2010) ‘Istewanat al boutaghaz… to’eed al hokoumah al 
misriyyah ila mourab’a tawabeer al khobz’, 13 February,  
www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11400&article=557042 
(accessed date 16 March 2016)
Al-Youm-al-Sabia (2013a) ‘Ahaly Ezbet Abo Hashish li Mohafez al 
Qahera: ala Gothetna law Had Kereb min Bda’atena’, 7 October, 
www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1286110#.UpiextLwmiE 
Al-Youm-al-Sabia (2013b) ‘Muhafiz al Qahera, el Ba’a lhom door watani fi 
Mogehet el Ikhwan wa Nasa’a lihel Moshakelatohem’, 28 September, 
www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1270942#.Upifc9LwmiE 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 3 May 2016: ‘Ruptures and Ripple Effects in the Middle East and Beyond’ 117–138 | 137
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (2008) M’a itesa’ Rak’at 
al go’ ’ala kharetat misr, www.anhri.net/egypt/ae/2008/pr0802-2.shtml 
(accessed 16 March 2016)
Awad, Maria (2011) Egypt Brotherhood Businessman: Manufacturing is 
Key, 28 October, Reuters, www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-
brotherhood-investment-idUSTRE79R1NQ20111028 (accessed 
16 March 2016)
Central Bank of  Egypt (2014), Economic Journal 53.3, 
2012/13, Cairo: CBE, www.cbe.org.eg/NR/rdonlyres/
F65A4340-DD1B-45A9-9F5A-F1F7F5AD8297/2228/
EconomicReviewVolumesVol53No320122013.pdf  (accessed 
16 March 2016)
Central Bank of  Egypt (2013) Annual Report 2011/12, Cairo: CBE 
www.cbe.org.eg/NR/rdonlyres/858DDCB9-C719-4B77-860E-
768F2E4CD4F0/1859/annualreport_20112012.pdf  (accessed 
16 March 2016)
Central Bank of  Egypt (2012) Annual Report 2010/11, Cairo: CBE, 
www.cbe.org.eg/NR/rdonlyres/40DD1FCD-A258-40AD-80A8-
CB3A0F40D572/1229/AnnualRepot2011ar.pdf  (accessed 16 March 
2016)
Central Bank of  Egypt (2010) Monthly Inflation Developments, August, 
Cairo: CBE
Chekir, Hamouda and Diwan, Ishac (2012) Crony Capitalism in Egypt, 
CID Working Paper 250, November, (updated August 2013), Center 
for International Development, Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke (2004) ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil 
War’, Oxford Economic Papers 56.4, October: 563–95
El-Beblawi, Hazem (2008) Economic Growth in Egypt: Impediments and 
Constraints (1974–2004), Washington DC: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/World Bank: 4
El-Erian, Mohamed (2012) ‘The Arabian Horse: Can Egypt’s Economy 
Deliver on the Revolutionary Promise of  a Better Future for All?’, 
Foreign Policy, 31 July, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/31/
the_arabian_horse (accessed 16 March 2016)
Krueger, Alan B. and Maleckova, Jitka (2002) Education, Poverty, Political 
Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?, Working Paper 
9074, Cambridge MA: National Bureau of  Economic Research
Ministry of  Planning (2013) Aham mou’asherat al ada’a al iqtesadi wal 







Okasha, Said (2012) Thawrat 25 yanayir bayn al-quwa al-muhafiza wa 
al-quwa al-thawriya, Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 
2 August, http://acpss.ahramdigital.org.eg/News.aspx?Serial=93#.
UBotcwIUgr8.facebook (accessed 16 March 2016)
138 | Rezk The Political Economy of Violence in Egypt
Vol. 47 No. 3 May 2016: ‘Ruptures and Ripple Effects in the Middle East and Beyond’
Richani, Nazih (1997) ‘The Political Economy of  Violence: The War-
System in Columbia’, Journal of  Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 
39.2, Summer: 37
Said, Abdel Moneim (2010) ‘While So Many Cried Foul Over the Results 
of  Egypt’s Parliamentary Elections, the Reality is that the Opposition 




Said, Ibrahim and Al-Qita’, Ahmed Ghoneim (2013) Al Khass fi Misr 
baad al thawra, Carnegie Center for Middle East Studies, 17 June, 
www.carnegie-mec.org/2013/06/17/القطاع-الخاص-في-مصر-بعد-
الثورة/gamb# (accessed 16 March 2016)
Shaath, Amr (2010), ‘Sokour awl daheya l’ tawabeer al khobz fi 
ramadan’, Masress, 17 August, www.masress.com/gn4me/3812076 
(accessed 16 March 2016)
Sobhi, Magdy (2012), ‘al-Tanmiya al-iqtisadiya wa al-ijtima’iya fi al-
barnamij al-ri’asi: hal huwa barnamij ‘amali qabil li al-tanfidh?’, 
Al-Ahram, 22 July
World Bank, Social and Economic Group, MENA region (2011) Poverty 
in Egypt 2008–09: Withstanding the Global Crisis, Report 60249-EG, 
17 June, Washington DC: World Bank
